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Abstract
We analyze the sequential choices of locations in the Hotelling [0, 1] space of
variety-differentiated products.  n firms locate in sequence, one at a time.  In stage n+1, all
firms choose prices simultaneously.  Firms anticipate correctly the decisions of subsequent
entrants, as well as the equilibrium prices, so we analyze subgame-perfect equilibria.  We
analyze two games.  In the first, the number of firms is fixed.  In the second, the number of
firms is determined by free entry, i.e., entry continues until the last entrant makes non-
negative profits.  When the number of firms is fixed, the ordering of profits follows the
order of action.  When the number of firms is determined by free entry, for a range of fixed
costs, early entrants choose their positions strategically so as to keep out potential entrants.
For a range of fixed costs, early actors reduce the distances among them to foreclose entry
even though these actions reduce their profits given the number of active firms.  For low
enough fixed costs, entry cannot be prevented any more and a new firm enters resulting in a
complete disruption of the locational pattern.  In the game with a fixed number of firms, we
find that the order of the profits of the firms is the same as the order of action, so that it pays
to be first.  In contrast, in the free entry game it does not always pay to be first.  We also
note that entry of a new firm significantly reduces the pre-entry profits of incumbents.  Thus,
if a technology is available that would increase the costs of both incumbents and entrants
(raising both rivals and own costs), it will be used to deter entry.
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1.  Introduction
Although there exist numerous models of symmetric locational product
differentiation, not enough modeling has been done of asymmetric locational settings.1
Nevertheless, there are many market situations where firms choose variety specifications
sequentially.  In this paper, we analyze a variation of Hotellings (1929) model of
differentiated products where firms locate sequentially in the product space and
subsequently all choose prices simultaneously.  This is a model of Stackelberg leadership in
the choice of locations, followed by a stage of simultaneous price choice. Because pricing
and production decisions are taken simultaneously, a firm that locates first does not have the
possibility to sell first or capture consumers.  However, such a firm can choose to position
itself in the product space most advantageously.
The main focus of the paper is the strategic asymmetry of the participants and the
resulting asymmetric locational equilibrium.  Since firms locate sequentially, the locational
choices of firms that act earlier influence the locational choices of subsequent actors.
Taking this into consideration, firms that locate early in the game carve their locational
niche anticipating the subsequent choices of locations.  Thus, we expect significant
differences in this models equilibrium in comparison with the traditional models of
simultaneous choice of locations.2  Although our analysis is of variety-differentiated
products, our results can also be applied to quality-differentiated products using the
equivalence established by Shaked and Sutton (1982).
We are interested in the game where firms can use their positioning to deter the entry
of subsequent firms.  As a preliminary tool for this analysis, we first analyze the game where
the number of firms is fixed.  In this game, with knowledge of the number n of active firms,
firms choose locations, one at each of n stages.3  In stage n + 1, firms choose prices
simultaneously.
We then examine the game where the number of firms is endogenously determined.
In this game, firms enter and locate, one at each stage.  At the end of this process, they
choose prices simultaneously.  Entry occurs as long as a firm can realize non-negative post-
entry profits.  We seek subgame-perfect equilibria.  In this game, each firm has a limited
ability to deter future entrants through its location choice.
                                                
1  Among the exceptions are Prescott and Visscher (1977), Lane (1980), Eaton and Wooders (1985) and
Rothschild (1976).  Our model is in the spirit of Lane (1980), but uses a locational framework as in Hotelling
(1929).  After the first version of our paper was circulating, we discovered that Neven (1987) has analyzed part
of the same problem independently.
2  For example, Salop, (1979), Economides (1989, 1993a).
3  In stage i, firm i  (i = 1, ..., n)  locates in the space of characteristics, C.  In choosing a location, firm i
anticipates correctly the location of firms of higher index that locate in later stages.  Thus, firm i acts as a
(location) leader with respect to firms i + 1, ..., n, and as a (location) follower with respect to firms  1, ..., i - 1.
2These games differ in the extent that firms can make commitments in locating and in
entering.  By separating the price choice to a later stage, we assume that prices are more
flexible than entry and location.  The sequential entry game assumes that entry and product
specification choice are equally flexible, while the fixed number of firms sequential location
game assumes that the entry choice is less flexible than the product specification choice.
The equilibrium locations imply a potential market area for each firm, which would
be its market share if all prices were equal.  Because price competition in general leads to
unequal equilibrium prices, the equilibrium market shares will differ from the potential
market areas.  Thus, a market can be look more (or less) concentrated at equilibrium than its
locational structure implies.
Given the locations, the equilibrium in prices is straightforward.  However, the
problem of searching for the equilibrium locations structure in the earlier stages of the game
is computationally quite hard.  Each firm has to take into account the effects of its locational
decision on the decisions of all firms that locate after it.  For example, firm 1 has to take into
account a number of effects.  First, the direct effects of its location choice, y1, on the
locational decision of firm 2, y2, on the locational decision of firm 3, y3, etc.  Second, firm 1
has to take into account the indirect effects.  There is a second round indirect effect of y1 on
y3 and y4 through y2.  There is also a third round indirect effect of y1 on y4 through y3 and
y2; that is, y4 is influenced by y3, as y3 is influenced by y2, which is itself influenced by y1.  It
is evident that the level of complexity of the calculation increases dramatically with the
number of stages in the decision process, which here coincides with the number of firms.
Because of the absence of closed-form solutions for these effects, we used numerical
techniques.  We chose locations yi on a grid of coarseness 0.01.4  Computing power
limitations restricted us to a maximum of five competing firms (brands).  We therefore
report results for two, three, four, and five brands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 sets up the basic model.
Section 2.1 discusses the equilibrium of the price (last) stage of the game.  Section 2.2
discusses the setup of the stage of sequential locations choice, both for a fixed and an
endogenously-determined number of firms.  Section 3 reports the results for the sequential
location game with a fixed number of firms.  Section 4 presents the results for the sequential
location game with an endogenously-determined number of firms.  Section 5 presents
concluding remarks.
2. Model Set-up
Let C be the line interval [0, 1].  Consumer of type z, z ∈ C, receives utility5
Uz(z, x, m, px) = m - px + k - λ(x - z)2
                                                
4  For n = 5 firms we used a grid of coarseness  0.02.  Use of a finer grid proved infeasible even with maximum
computing power.
5  The homogeneous outside good can be thought of as a Hicksian composite commodity.
3from the consumption of one unit of differentiated good of type x sold at price  px.  With this
utility specification, consumer z has single-peaked preferences in the space of
characteristics, which peak at x = z, when the specification of the offered product x
coincides with the consumers ideal product specification z.  If consumer of type z (who
prefers most variety z) buys a product of specification x other than z, he incurs a utility
cost (loss) of  λ(x - z)2.   Parameter k represents the reservation price for the most preferred
variety.  We assume that k is large enough so that all consumers buy one unit of the
differentiated product.  Consumers are distributed uniformly according to their type on C.
There are no variable production costs, although the extension to constant marginal costs is
straightforward.6
We begin by analyzing the last stage where firms choose prices.  In the earlier stages
of the game, firms i = 1, , n have chosen locations (y1, ..., yn).  These locations are, in
general, not ordered a priori in any way. To analyze the price stage, we order the locations
yi and assign them one to one to locations xj such that xj ≥ xj-1.  If two (or more) firms have
located at the same position, then the equilibrium price (and profits) for these firms in the
second stage subgame will be zero.7  Thus, no two firms will choose the same location, and
we assume that n firms are at distinct locations  (x1, ..., xn) ≡ x, where  xj+1 > xj, for  j = 1, ...,
n - 1.  The demand faced by a typical firm j (other than the first or last firms) is generated by
consumers in the interval [zj-1, zj], where zj (respectively zj-1) represents the marginal
consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm j and j+1 (respectively j and j-1).
Since the marginal consumer is
zj = [(pj+1 - pj)/(xj+1 - xj) + λ(xj+1 + xj)]/(2λ),
the demand facing firm j ≠1, j ≠ n is
         zj
Dj = ∫  dz = [(pj+1 - pj)/(xj+1 - xj) - (pj - pj-1)/(xj - xj-1) + λ(xj+1 - xj-1)]/(2λ).
        zj-1
For the first and the last firms, demand is:
              z1
D1 = ∫ dz = [(p2 - p1)/(x2 - x1) + λ(x1 + x2])/(2λ),
            0
                     1
Dn = ∫ dz = 1 - [(pn - pn-1)/(xn - xn-1) + λ(xn + xn-1)]/(2λ).
                   zn-1
                                                
6  In a model with constant marginal cost c, a price p of this model is interpreted as the increment of price above
marginal cost.  Thus, in the positive marginal cost model, prices are P = p + c.
7  Price-setting firms drive price to marginal cost when their specifications are identical.
42.1 Equilibrium In The Price (Last) Stage
Letting p ≡ (p1, ..., pn)  denote the vector of prices and assuming no costs, the profit
function of firm  j  is
Πj(p, x) = pjDj(p, x).
In the last stage of the game, all firms choose prices simultaneously.  The non-cooperative
equilibrium of a price subgame played for fixed locations is characterized by the following
first order conditions for firms 2 to n-1:
2pj[1/(xj+1 - xj) + 1/(xj - xj-1)] - pj-1/(x j - xj-1) - pj+1/(xj+1 - xj) = λ(xj+1 - xj-1),
j = 2, ..., n - 1.
For the first and the last firms, first order conditions are:
2p1/(x2 - x1) - p2/(x2 - x1) = λ(x1 + x2),
2pn/(xn - xn-1) - pn-1/(xn - xn-1) = λ[2 - (xn + xn-1)].
All maximization conditions can be summarized as
B.p* = w, (1)
where
wj = λ(xj+1 - xj-1), Bj = (0, ..., 0, -1/(xj - xj-1), 2[1/(xj+1 - xj) + 1/(xj - xj-1)], -1/(xj+1 - xj), 0, ..., 0),
for  j ≠ 1 , j ≠  n, and
w1 = λ(x1 + x2),  wn = λ[2 - (xn + xn-1)],
B1 = (2/(x2 - x1), -1/(x2 - x1), ..., 0),  Bn = (0, ..., -1/(xn - xn-1), 2/(xn - xn-1)). 8
The profit functions in the subgame of price choice (stage n+1) are concave since
demand functions are linear.9  Therefore second order conditions are also satisfied, and the
subgame has a non-cooperative equilibrium.  Moreover, for each location vector x, the
equilibrium prices vector p*(x) = (p1(x), ..., pj(x), ..., pn(x)) is unique.  Uniqueness of the
equilibrium is guaranteed from the fact that the best reply mapping is a contraction since
                                                
8  Bj is the jth row of matrix B.
9  This is a consequence of the quadratic transportation costs in distance, as observed by DAspremont et al.
(1979) and Economides (1989).
5∂2Πj/∂pj2 +  Σ   ∂2Πj/∂pj∂pi < 0.
      i ≠ j
Using numerical techniques we solve the system (1) and derive the equilibrium prices as
functions of locations,
p*(x) = (p1*(x), ..., pn*(x)) (2)
Equilibrium profits of firm j, j ≠ 1, j ≠ n, are:
Πj*(x) ≡ Πj(p*(x), x) = pj*Dj* = (pj*(x))2[1/(xj+1 - xj) + 1/(xj - xj-1)]/(2λ). (3a)
For the first and last firms equilibrium profits are:
Π1*(x) ≡ Π1(p*(x), x) = p1*D1* = (p1*(x))2/[2λ(x2 - x1)], (3b)
Πn*(x) ≡ Πn(p*(x), x) = p n*D n* = (pn*(x))2/[2λ(xn - xn-1)]. (3c)
2.2 Setup of The Sequential Locations Choice Stage
The equilibrium profits of the price subgame are the objective functions of the first n
stages, where firms choose locations.  Firm i acts as a location-choice leader with respect to
firms i + 1, ..., n, and as a location-choice follower with respect to firms 1, ..., i - 1.  Thus,
firm i recognizes the influence of its location choice xi on firms i + k, k > 0, but considers
location choices yi-k, k > 0, as fixed.  We will consider two sequential location games.  In the
first game, the number of firms is fixed.  Thus, a firm that acts first has the ability to
influence the market area that will be under the control of firms that choose location later,
but cannot influence the number of active firms.  In the second game, the number of active
firms is determined by a zero profit condition.  Thus, by locating appropriately, an early
locator can limit the profits of firms that locate later, and, for some range of fixed costs,
make the profits of a potential entrant negative so that it does not enter the market.
Therefore, when the number of firms is variable and determined by zero profit condition,
firms can use their locational choice strategically to limit the number of competitors.
Let the equilibrium locations be
y* = (y1*, ..., yi*..., yn*),
corresponding to
x* = (x1*, ..., xj*, ..., xn*).
Subgame-perfect equilibrium prices are found by substitution in equation (2) as
p*(x*) = (p1*(x*), ..., pn*(x*)).
6In discussing the equilibrium locations of firms, a few definitions are necessary.  We
define the potential market area for a firm located at xj as half the distance between the
immediate firm to the right and the immediate firm to the left, mj = (xj+1  xj-1)/2, where for
the firm closest to 0 and the firm closest to 1 we interpret x0 = 0 and xn+1 = 1.  The potential
market area would be the realized equilibrium demand if all prices were equal.
We also define the locational asymmetry index (LAI) as
LAI = Σnj=1 (mj)2 = Σnj=1 [(xj+1  xj-1)/2]2. (4)
This index has similar properties to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market
concentration (HHI), defined as the sum of the squared market shares, HHI = Σni=1 si2,
where si is the share of sales of firm i.  LAI decreases as the locations become more
symmetric.  By its definition, the locational asymmetry index, LAI, takes the same value as
the Herfindahl index for a market with shares mj.  Thus, when prices are equal, the index of
locational asymmetry collapses to the Herfindahl index.  Index LAI also tends to decrease as
the number of brands increases.  By comparing the locational asymmetry index, LAI, with
the Herfindahl index, HHI, we can indirectly measure the extent to which locational
asymmetries are translated into differences in equilibrium market shares.
In general, we expect that the sequential location equilibria will be asymmetric, and
this will reduce surplus.  We also expect that total surplus will be lower in the game of
sequential location because the asymmetric distribution of locations forces consumers to
travel longer distances on the average, and transportation costs are convex in distance.  To
assess the extent of the distortion of total surplus, we calculate the surplus loss due to
transportation costs in our asymmetric model and we compare it with its counterpart for
symmetric locations.  The surplus loss due to transportation costs of consumers who buy
from the firm located at xj is
        zj-xj  xj-zj-1
 CSLj =  ∫    λs2 ds + ∫      λs2 ds = λ[(zj - xj)3 + (xj - zj-1)3]/3, (5)
                      0   0
where zj, zj-1 are the marginal consumers of firm j.  Industry-wide consumers surplus loss
due to transportation costs (i.e., because consumers are not offered their ideal varieties) is
CSL(n) = Σnj=1 CSLj.  As a reference point for surplus comparisons, we note that the optimal
locational structure is symmetric with consecutive firms located 1/n apart, and the first and
last firms located at 1/2n  from the boundaries.  The minimal (given the number of varieties)
consumers surplus loss from transportation costs at the optimal surplus structure is
CSLo(n) = 1/(12n2).  We will also refer to the consumers surplus of the game of
simultaneous location choice as CSLs(n).10
                                                
10  In the comparisons with the simultaneous-location game (with subsequent simultaneous choice of prices) we
use the results of Jingbin Cao (1991).
73. Results for the Sequential Location Game With a Fixed Number of Firms
We first analyze the sequential location game when the number of firms is fixed.
The equilibrium locations for 2, 3, 4, and 5 firms are shown in Figure 1.  In the tables below
we note the equilibrium locations with a fixed number of firms, and we compare the
equilibrium surplus loss, CSL(n), with the surplus loss of the simultaneous locations choice
game, CSLs(n), and the minimum surplus loss of the optimal locational structure, CSLo(n).
Figure 1:  Sequential Location Choices With a Fixed Number of Firms
n = 2
























Equilibrium locations and prices in sequential choice with two competing firms
Firm Number Location      Price          Profits     Market Share    Pot. Market Area
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1 0 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 *
2 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 *
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
CSL(2) = 0.0833331, CSLs(2) = 0.083333, CSLo(2) = 0.020833,
CSL(2)/CSLs(2) = 1, CSL(2)/CSLo(2) = 4,
HHI(2) = 0.5, LAI(2) = 0.5.
Asterisks (*) indicate the firms that locate closest to the endpoints of the market at 0
and 1.  In duopoly, firms choose to locate at the endpoints.  This is exactly the same
equilibrium as in the game of simultaneous choice described by DAspremont et al.
(1979).11  Thus, prices and profits are equal, p1 = p2 = 1 and Π1 = Π2 = 0.5.  The Herfindahl
index and locational asymmetry indexes are equal, HHI(2) = LAI = 0.5.  Despite equality in
market shares, there are significant losses because the firms are located far apart.  These
losses are indicated by the high ratio of actual surplus loss CSL(2) compared to minimal
surplus loss CSLo(2) of the optimal (surplus maximizing) locational structure.
Table 2
Equilibrium locations and prices in sequential choice with three competing firms
Firm Number Location Price          Profits          Market Share   Pot. Market Area
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1 0.58 0.197153 0.093647 0.475000 0.425
2 0.09 0.262726 0.070433 0.268088 0.335 *
3 0.94 0.184976 0.047522 0.256912 0.24 *
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
CSL(3) = 0.016304, CSLs(3) = 0.011393, CSLo(3) = 0.009259,
CSL(3)/CSLs(3) = 1.43, CSL(3)/CSLo(3) = 1.76,
HHI(3) = 0.3635, LAI(3) = 0.3504.
The first firm locates near the center of the market, but not exactly at the center.
Firm 1 anticipates the positioning of firms 2 and 3 on its left and right.  By creating an
asymmetric situation for the other firms, firm 1 gets a larger potential market share than if
the situation was symmetric with firm 1 locating at 0.5 and firms 2 and 3 locating at 0.5 - d
and 0.5 + d.  Further, firm 1 expands output beyond its potential market share.  Firm 1
accomplishes this result by choosing a price that is only slightly above the price of firm 3, p2
> p1 > p3.  The order of equilibrium profits follows the order of action, Π1 > Π2 > Π3.  The
variance of the potential market areas is smaller than the variance of the equilibrium market
                                                
11  From DAspremont et al. (1979) we know that if firm 1 locates at any  x1 ∈ [0, .5), firm  2  chooses  x2*(x1)
= 1  because ∂Π2**/∂x2 > 0  for all  x2 ∈ (x1, 1].  Firm 1 maximizes Π1**(x1, x2*(x1)) = Π1**(x1, 1) with respect to
x1.  Since  ∂Π1**(x1, 1)/∂x1 < 0 for all x1 < 1, firm 1 chooses x1 = 0.  Therefore the equilibrium is x1* = 0, x2* = 1,
and it coincides with the equilibrium of the simultaneous location choices game.
9shares; the index of locational inequality is smaller than the Herfindahl index, LAI(3) <
HHI(3).  This shows that firms convert their locational advantages into higher market shares
than their potential market areas.  The surplus loss because of transportation costs is CSL(3)
= 0.016304.  This is 43% larger than the surplus loss in the case of simultaneously locating
firms, CSLs(3) = 0.011393.  Compared to optimality, CSL(3) is 76%  larger than the
minimum surplus loss.
Table 3
Equilibrium locations and prices in sequential choice with four competing firms
Firm Number Location Price          Profits          Market Share   Pot. Market Area
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1 0.43 0.099709 0.032374 0.324685 0.31
2 0.09 0.138255 0.028109 0.203316 0.26 *
3 0.71 0.076190 0.022985 0.301684 0.255
4 0.94 0.078345 0.013343 0.170315 0.175 *
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
CSL(4) = .008025, CSLs(4) = 0.007626,  CSLo(4) = 0.005208,
CSL(4)/CSLs(4) = 1.05, CSL(4)/CSLo(4) = 1.54,
HHI(4) = 0.2668, LAI(4) = .2593.
The general locational pattern of firms 1, 2, and 3 in the four-brand case is very
similar to their locational pattern in the three-brand case.  Firms 1 and 3 are squeezed to the
right of their positions in the three-brand case.  The last (fourth) firm finds four open
intervals that are ordered in terms of length as [0.09, 0.43], [0.71, 1], [0.43, 0.71], and [0,
0.09].  It locates at 0.94, which is in the second largest interval, [0.71, 1], and has the
advantage of no competition from the right.  Anticipating the location of the fourth firm to
its right, the third firm locates in the largest interval available to it after firms 1 and 2 have
located.  Firm 3 chooses a location slightly to the right of the midpoint of the interval  [0.43,
1], and thus can significantly squeeze firm 4, which is left with a relatively small potential
market area.
Looking at the overall picture, we note that the second and the fourth firms choose
locations nearest to the boundaries of the product space.  The sequence of choices is
leapfrogging, x1 = 0.43, x2 = 0.09, x3 = 0.71, x4 = 0.94.  The ordering of profits still follows
the order of actions, Π1 > Π2 > Π3 > Π4.  The first firm is able to take advantage of acting
first by securing the largest potential market area.  Since its price is not the highest, p2 > p1 >
p4 > p3, it has an even larger market share.  The second firm has a higher price than both of
its neighbors (firms 1 and 3).  Its profits are smaller than those of firm 1, whose potential
market area is larger than firm 2s but are greater than the profits of firm 3, whose potential
market area is slightly smaller than that of firm 2.  The surplus loss because of transportation
costs is CSL(4) = 0.008025, which is 5% larger than the surplus loss of the case of
simultaneously locating firms, CSLs(4) = 0.007626.  Compared to optimality, CSL(4) is
54% larger than the minimum surplus loss.
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Table 4
Equilibrium locations and prices in sequential choice with five competing firms
Firm Number Location Price          Profits          Market Share   Pot. Market Area
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1 0.50 0.0613 0.014456 0.2358 0.26
2 0.76 0.055014 0.0133868 0.2434 0.23
3 0.24 0.055014 0.0133868 0.2434 0.23
4 0.96 0.055507 0.007702 0.1388 0.14 *
5 0.04 0.055507 0.007702 0.1388 0.14 *
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
CSL(5) = 0.0043823, CSLs(5) = 0.005209, CSLo(5) = 0.003333,
CSL(5)/CSLs(5) = 0.8413, CSL(5)/CSLo(5) = 1.3147,
HHI(5) = 0.2125, LAI(5) = 0.2126.
As in the cases discussed earlier, each firm locates in the largest remaining interval
at the time of its choice.  The sequence of locational moves again leapfrogs.  Like the case
of three brands, and unlike the case of four brands, the last two firms locate very close to the
boundaries. Different from previous cases, here we observe a certain level of symmetry.
The first firm locates in the middle of the interval, firm 3 follows the same strategy of firm 2
but at the opposite side of firm 1, and firm 5 locates symmetrically to firm 4.  The first firm
does not manage to carve out a significant market area for itself and can secure a potential
market area that is slightly larger to the second and third firms potential market area.
Further, its price is significantly higher than the price of the second and third firms which
are its two neighbors.  Thus, the first firm realizes a market share that is lower than its
potential market area.  In contrast, the second and third firms, with smaller potential market
share to that of the first firm, capture the highest market share because they face high prices
on both sides (firms 1, 4 and 5).  As in previous cases, profits follow the order of action.
The complete comparisons of prices and profits are p1 > p4 = p5 > p2 = p3 and Π1 > Π2 = Π3
> Π4 = Π5.  The surplus loss because of transportation costs is CSL(5) = 0.0043823, which is
15.9%  smaller than the surplus loss of the case of simultaneously locating firms, CSLs(5) =
0.005209.  This shows a more favorable positioning of the firms from the welfare point of
view than in the simultaneous game.  Of course, compared to optimality the surplus loss is
larger -- CSL(5) is  29.9%  larger than the minimum surplus loss.
The main features of the sequential location equilibria with a fixed number of firms
can be summarized as follows:
(1) In the case of two brands the equilibrium of the sequential location game coincides with
the equilibrium in the simultaneous location choice game.
(2) For three or more brands we have the following results.  The order of action is preserved
in the order of equilibrium potential market areas, and profits. In the case of three and
four firms, the second firm is the one with the highest price.  But in the case of five
firms the first firm exhibits the highest price.
(3) The equilibrium market shares exhibit more variance than the potential market areas of
the firms.  The locational asymmetry index, LAI, is lower than the Herfindahl index,
HHI.  Firms with an advantage in potential market share are able to accentuate their
advantage and achieve an even higher market share at equilibrium.  Still, prices and
profits vary more across firms, than equilibrium market shares.
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(4) The surplus loss due to transportation costs ranges from 43% above (for the case of
three firms) to 16% below (for the case of five firms) the surplus loss of the model of
simultaneous location.  The ratio of the surplus loss in the sequential game to the surplus
loss in the simultaneous game, CSL(n)/CSLs(n)  decreases in the number of firms  n  3
(and so do both CSL(n) and CSLs(n).  The ratio of the surplus loss in the sequential
game to the minimum surplus loss of the optimal positioning, CSL(n)/CSLo(n)  also
decreases in the number of firms.
4. Results for the Sequential Location Game With an Endogenously-Determined
Number of Firms
In this game, the number of active firms is endogenously determined by the
requirement that the last active firm makes positive or zero profits.  The crucial feature of
this game is the possibility that location and product positioning can be used strategically
to deter entry.  We use Π to denote short run profits, i.e., revenues minus variable costs.
Profits in the usual definition are Π  F, where F is the fixed cost.  Thus, the number of
active firms n fulfills Π(n) ≥ F, and Π(n + 1) < F.
For example, suppose that there is one firm in the market, and that the fixed cost
is so high that only a second firm could enter the market.  We first compute y2*(y1), the
optimal location of firm 2 for any location of firm 1 by maximizing duopoly profits of
firm 2, Π2(y1, y2). Let the maximized equilibrium short run profits of firm 2 be Π2*(y1) ≡
Π2(y1, y2*(y1)).  If Π2*(y1) > F, then firm 2 enters the market.  Given F, we collect points y1
that fulfill Π2*(y1) > F into set E2, E2 = {y1│ Π2*(y1) > F}.  For low F, firm 2 enters
irrespective of the location of firm 1, so that E2 = C.  As F increases, the set E2 of the
locations of firms 1 such that firm 2 can enter profitably shrinks.  Firm 1 finds its maximum
profits by maximizing Π1(y1, y2*(y1))  with respect to  y1, subject to  Π2*(y1) > F, i.e., subject
to  y1 ∈ E2.  Let the solution of this maximization be y1*, and the corresponding profits be
Π1* = Π1(y1*, y2*(y1*)).  The choice of location y1* is the optimal accommodating strategy of
firm 1.
If Π2*(y1) < F, then firm 2 does not enter the market.  This condition holds for all y1
∉ E2.  Firm 1 finds its maximum profits by maximizing the monopoly profits Π1(y1) subject
to  Π2*(y1) < F, i.e., for all  y1 ∉ E2.  Let the solution of this maximization be y1** and the
corresponding profits be Π1** = Π1(y1**).  The choice of location y1** is the optimal
deterrence strategy of firm 1.  In choosing whether to deter or accept entry, firm 1 chooses
between the optimal accommodating strategy y1* and the optimal deterrence strategy y1** by
comparing the corresponding profits Π1* and Π1**.
Now consider the situation for lower fixed costs, when there may be three firms in
the market.  We first compute y3*(y1, y2), the optimal location of firm 3 for any pairs of
locations of firms 1 and 2.  We find the maximized equilibrium short run profits of firm 3,
Π3*(y1, y2) = Π3(y1, y2, y3*(y1, y2)).
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If Π3*(y1, y2) > F, then firm 3 enters the market.  We collect pairs  (y1, y2) that fulfill
Π3*(y1, y2) > F into set  E3,  E3 = {(y1, y2) │ Π3*(y1, y2) > F}.  Firm 2 maximizes Π2(y1, y2,
y3*(y1, y2))  with respect to  y2  subject to  Π3*(y1, y2) > F, i.e., subject to  (y1, y2) ∈ E3.  Let
the solution of this maximization be y2a (y1).  This is the optimal accommodating strategy of
firm 2.  The corresponding profits are Π2a(y1) = Π2(y1, x2a(y1), y3*(y1, y2a(y1))).
If Π3*(y1, y2) < F, then firm 3 does not enter the market.  This condition holds for all
(y1, y2) ∉ E3.  Firm 2 then maximizes the duopoly profits Π1(y1, y2)  subject to  Π3*(y1, y2) <
F,  i.e., for all  (y1, y2) ∉  E3.  Let the optimal choice for firm 2 be y2d(y1).  This is the
optimal deterrence strategy of firm 2.  The corresponding profits are Π2d(y1) =  Π2(y1,
y2d(y1)).  Firm 2 will choose to let firm 3 enter if its profits with (optimal) deterrence are
lower than with (optimal) acceptance of firm 3, i.e.,
Π2d(y1) < Π2  a(y1) (5)
Let E32 be the collection of all locations y1 such that firm 2 prefers to see firm 3 enter, i.e.,
where (5) holds.
Firm 1 has to choose either its best location that will lead to entry by firm 3, or the
best location that will lead to deterrence of firm 3.  Assuming that firm 3 will enter, and that
firm 2 prefers that firm 3 enters, firm 1 chooses its best location by maximizing the
accommodation profits.  Formally, for y1 ∈ E32 and (y1, y2a(y1)) ∈ E3, firm 1 maximizes
triopoly profits Π1a(y1) = Π1(y1, y2a(y1), y3*(y1, y2a(y1))) with respect to y1.  Let firm 1s
optimal accommodation strategy be y1a and the corresponding profits be Π1 a = Π1a(y1a).
In contrast, assuming that firm 3 does not enter, and that firm 2 prefers that firm 3
does not enter, firm 1 chooses its best location by maximizing the deterrence profits.
Formally, for y1 ∉ E32 and (y1, y2d(y1)) ∉ E3, firm 1 maximizes duopoly profits  Π1(y1,
y2d(y1))  by choosing the optimal deterrence strategy  y1d.  The implied location for firm 2 is
y2d(y1d).  Firm 1 realizes profits Π1d = Π1(y1d), y2d(y1d)), and firm 2 realizes profits Π2d =
Π2((y1d), y2d(y1d)).  Finally, firm 1 compares the profits Π1** it makes when it deters firm 2
(if that is possible) and it compares them with Π1d and Π1a.
Since, in general, profits with a larger number of active firms are lower, early
actors try to position themselves so as to deter entry.  For a range of fixed costs F, n
active firms do not face a serious threat of entry by firm n+1, since, for these fixed costs,
the profits of firm n + 1 are very negative.  As F decreases, the threat of entry of firm n +
1 becomes viable and the n active firms position themselves in sequence so that the
potential entrant would makes small negative profits if it were to enter.  As the fixed cost
is lowered, active firms have to adjust their position to make sure that the potential
entrant stays out.  They do so purely to deter entry and even though it decreases their
profits.  It is just that the incumbents profits would have been further reduced if they had
not adjusted their positions and the potential entrant had entered.  As F is lowered further,
entry of firm n + 1 is profitable irrespective of the actions of the n incumbents.  That is,
even the optimal deterrence strategy of the n incumbents cannot stop the entrant from
making positive profits once it enters, and entry occurs.
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4.1 Specific Results
4.1.1 One And Two Active Firms
Our specific results follow.  We report on the locational pattern, prices, market
shares, potential market shares, profits, surplus loss, and on the locational asymmetry and
Herfindahl indices.  For very high fixed cost F > 0.0677, only one firm can survive.  It
locates at y1 = 0.5, since this is both the profit maximizing monopoly position and the best
position for deterrence of entry of a second firm.  For F < 0.0677, firm 2 enters.  Firms
locate at y1 = 0.669 and y2 = 0 to deter entry.  If there was no entry deterrence issue, the
firms would have located at the interval endpoints, y1 = 1, y2 = 0, and would have realized
higher profits.  As F decreases, firms 1 and 2 locate closer to deter entry.  At F = 0.025857,
they cannot deter entry anymore, and firm 3 enters.  See Figure 2.
As fixed cost decreases from 0.0677 to 0.025857 and the two incumbent firms locate
closer to deter entry, their prices and profits decrease, as shown in Figures 3 and 4.  Market
share and potential market share differences eventually decrease as F decreases, as seen in
Figures 5 and 6.  It is worth noting that potential market share differences are larger than
actual market share differences.  This implies that the index of locational asymmetry is
larger than the Herfindahl index, as seen in Figure 7. This means that the market has less
asymmetric production than would result if firms produced according to their potential
market areas.
It is important to note that entry of a third firm and the discontinuous change in the
locations of incumbent firms significantly reduces the pre-entry profits of the two
incumbents.  Thus, if a technology is available that would increase the (fixed) costs of both
incumbents and potential entrants (raising both rivals and own costs), it will be used to
deter entry.  The entry-induced disruption of the locational pattern resulting in significant
profit changes and the fact that it can be prevented by a very small ε increase in fixed
cost of all firms, guarantees that, if available, such raising both rivals and own costs
strategy will be used in this case and in the cases of three, four and five firms.
14
Figure 2:  Equilibrium locations in sequential choice with free entry, 2 firms



























































































Figure 4:  Equilibrium profits in sequential choice with free entry, 2 firms


























































































Figure 6:  Equilibrium potential market share in sequential choice with free entry, 2
firms
Figure 7:  Comparison of Herfindahl Index and Locational Asymmetry Index in
sequential choice with free entry, 2 firms
Table 5, below, shows the locations, prices, profits, etc. for the lowest fixed cost for
which the entry of the fourth firm is prevented.  In terms of figures 2 to 7, table 5 shows
the data of the one before the last observation on the right.  We next compare the data on
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Equilibrium locations and prices in sequential choice with two competing firms
and free entry for F = 0.0259
Firm Number Location Price          Profits          Market Share   Pot. Market Area
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1 0.67 0.34 0.17 0.50 0.50
2 0.33 0.34 0.17 0.50 0.50
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
CSLFE(2) = 0.02723,12 CSLs(2) = 0.083333, CSLo(2) = 0.020833,
CSLFE(2)/CSLs(2) = 0.3268, CSLFE(2)/CSLo(2) = 1.31,
HHIFE(2) = 0.50, LAIFE(3) = 0.50.
When we compare the outcome of table 5 with that of table 1, we see that, as
expected, firms make large sacrifices to deter entry.  Prices and profits in the last point of
entry deterrence are about 1/3 of their values in the no-threat-of entry sequential
equilibrium.  Although both firms end up with identical profits in the last point of entry
deterrence, at all fixed costs except the lowest one, firm 1 realizes higher profits and
prices than firm 2, as seen in figures 3 and 4.  Similarly, market share and potential
market share are higher for firm 1 at all fixed costs except the lowest, as seen in figures 5
and 6.  For the intermediate values of fixed cost, the divergence in potential market
shares between firms 1 and 2 is larger than the divergence in actual market shares.  Thus,
for intermediate values of fixed cost, the locational asymmetry index is larger than the
Herfindahl index, as seen in Figure 7.  In terms of surplus loss, the free entry game has
about 1/3 of the surplus loss of the game with fixed number of firms.
4.1.2 Three Active Firms
For fixed cost values F ∈ [0.009, 0.025857] we have three active firms.  For F >
0.022, a fourth firm does not pose a threat of entry because its profits are very small, so the
three active firms do not attempt foreclosure strategies.  For F < 0.022, the three active firms
try to reduce the gaps between them to foreclose entry of a fourth firm.  We also observe a
discontinuity in the locations of the three firms around F = 0.018.  After the discontinuity all
players seem to follow the continuation of the position strategy previous to the discontinuity.
They continue reducing the gaps between them until ending with y1 = 0.5, y2 = 0.25, y3 =
0.75, for F = 0.009.  At F = 0.0089 a fourth firm enters and all firms adjust their positions to
y1 = 0.43, y2 = 0.09, y3 = 0.71, y4 = 0.94.  The equilibrium locations of three active firms as
fixed costs are decreasing are shown in figure 8.
                                                
12  The superscript FE means final equilibrium indicates that the measurement corresponds to the























































Figure 8:  Equilibrium locations in sequential choice with free entry, 3 firms
As the fixed cost decreases, the three firms come closer to each other to prevent the
entry of a fourth firm, and the prices and profits of firms 1 and 2 fall.  See figures 9 and 10.
The price and profits of the third firm generally decrease, but, for a region of fixed costs,
they increase as firm 3 finds itself in a better position because of the impact of the entry

































































































Figure 10:  Equilibrium profits in sequential choice with free entry, 3 firms
Figures 11 and 12 show the equilibrium market shares and the potential market
share as the fixed cost decreases.  We see that the market share of the first entrant
decreases as fixed costs decrease and entry deterrence becomes more pressing.  As the
same time, firms 2 and 3 get higher market shares for lower fixed costs.  Except for the
discontinuity discussed earlier, the order of the equilibrium market shares sizes of all
firms remains the same as the order of entry for the range of fixed costs with three active
firms.  This is despite the fact that potential market share sizes vary considerable and the
order of potential market shares is reversed more than once as fixed costs decrease.
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Figure 12:  Equilibrium potential market share in sequential choice with free entry, 3
firms
Figure 13 shows the comparison of the Herfindahl and locational asymmetry
indexes as fixed costs decrease.  Locational asymmetry is smaller than the Herfindahl
index, except for the discontinuous choice at F = 0.018. This means that the market has
more asymmetric production than would result if firms produced according to their
potential market areas.  Therefore, firms are able to convert locational asymmetries to
even larger market share asymmetries.













































Figure 13:  Comparison of Herfindahl Index and Locational Asymmetry Index in
sequential choice with free entry, 3 firms
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The following table shows the locations, prices, profits, etc. for the lowest fixed cost
for which the entry of the fourth firm is prevented.  In terms of figures 8 to 13, table 6
shows the data of the one before the last observation on the right.  We next compare the
data on table 6 with table 2, which also shows the data of the first point on the left of
figures 8 to 13.
Table 6
Equilibrium locations and prices in sequential choice with three competing firms
and free entry for F = 0.009
Firm Number Location Price          Profits          Market Share   Pot. Market Area
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1 0.50 0.1041 0.0434 0.42 0.25
2 0.25 0.1458 0.0425 0.29 0.38 *
3 0.75 0.1458 0.0425 0.29 0.38 *
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
CSLFE(3) = 0.01659, CSLs(3) = 0.011393,  CSLo(3) = 0.009259,
CSLFE(3)/CSLs(3) = 1.46, CSLFE(3)/CSLo(3) = 1.79,
HHIFE(3) = 0.34, LAIFE(3) = 0.34.
A comparison between tables 2 and 6 shows very significant reductions in prices and
profits (excluding fixed costs) of all three firms under free entry in their attempt to thwart
entry of a fourth firm.  The biggest loss of profits occurs for the first firm, which had the
highest profits when the number of firms was fixed at three, and makes less than half of
these under free entry.  Also, prices fall as a result of the increased competition among the
three firms, which have located closer to each other to prevent entry.  We also note that
market share and potential market share inequalities is significant under free entry but lower
than when the number of firms was fixed.  This is also shown by the lower HHI and LAI
indices in the free entry case, HHIFE(3) < HHI(3), and LAIFE(3) < LAI(3).  Notice that, in
contrast with the two-firm case, for three active firms, consumers surplus loss is larger in
the free entry case than in the no-entry-threat case.
4.1.3 Four Active Firms
For fixed cost values F ∈ (0.00425, 0.0089], at equilibrium there are four active
firms.  For F ∈ [0.0085, 0.0089] there is no fifth firm entry threat.  For F < 0.0085, the entry
threat of the fifth firm appears and the four active firms close the gaps between them to
foreclose entry of the fifth firm.  We also observe discontinuities in positioning both at F =
0.0055 and at F = 0.0045.  In the first discontinuity, as F is lowered below 0.0055, firm 2
switches order in [0, 1] with firm 4, and firm 2 becomes the one with the outer location
closer to 1.  In the second discontinuity, as F is lowered below 0.0045, firm 1 switches order
in [0, 1] with firm 3.   As we will see, both of these switches have significant consequences
for equilibrium prices and profits.  At F = 0.00425, a fifth player enters, and firms take































































Figure 14:  Equilibrium locations in sequential choice with free entry, 4 firms
As the four active firms come closer to each other to prevent the entry of a fifth firm,
the prices of the four active firms are generally non-monotonic.  Only the second firms
price is non-increasing throughout the fixed cost region of four active firms.  See figure 15.
Similarly, there are significant upheavals in the ordering of profits as fixed costs decrease, as
seen in figure 16.  Only the first firms profits are decreasing throughout the region as fixed
costs decrease.  Similarly, there are a number of re-orderings of market shares and potential
market shares as fixed costs vary, as seen in figures 17 and 18.  Only the first firms market
share and potential market share are decreasing throughout the region as fixed costs
decrease.  Moreover, the Herfindahl and the locational asymmetry indexes reverse their
order as fixed costs vary, as seen in figure 19.
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Figure 17:  Equilibrium market share in sequential choice with free entry, 4 firms
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Figure 19:  Comparison of Herfindahl Index and Locational Asymmetry Index in
sequential choice with free entry, 4 firms
The following table shows the locations, prices, profits, etc. for the lowest fixed cost
for which the entry of the fifth firm is prevented.  In terms of figures 14 to 19, table 7
shows the data of the one before the last observation on the right.  We next compare the
data on table 7 with table 3, which also shows the data of the first point on the left of
figures 14 to 19.
Table 7
Equilibrium locations and prices in sequential choice with four competing firms
and free entry for F = 0.00435
Firm Number Location Price          Profits          Market Share   Pot. Market Area
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1 0.20 0.0880 0.0194 0.22 0.30 *
2 0.80 0.0880 0.0194 0.22 0.30 *
3 0.40 0.0560 0.0157 0.28 0.20
4 0.60 0.0560 0.0157 0.28 0.20
───────────────────────────────────────────────────
CSLFE(4) = 0.00989, CSLs(4) = 0.007626,  CSLo(4) = 0.005208,
CSLFE(4)/CSLs(4) = 1.36, CSLFE(4)/CSLo(4) = 1.90,
HHIFE(4) = 0.2536, LAIFE(4) = 0.2600.
Figure 20 shows the equilibrium locations of firms in the game of sequential
locations choice with free entry as the fixed cost varies.





















































Figure 20:  Equilibrium locations in sequential choice with free entry

















5.  Concluding Remarks
We analyzed two games of sequential location with subsequent simultaneous price
choice.  In the first game, the number of active firms is fixed.  In the second one, there is
free entry.  We find significant differences between the game of sequential choice of
locations and the traditional game of simultaneous choices of locations.  In locating
sequentially, some firms are able to create locational asymmetries and take advantage of
them.  Moreover, we find significant differences in the equilibria of the sequential location
game with a fixed number of firms from the sequential location game with free entry.
In the sequential location game with a fixed number of competitors, the order of
profits is identical to the order of action of the active firms, so that it always pays to locate
first.  A striking result is the fact that, in the free entry game, it does not always pay to be
first.13  For example, in the three firm equilibrium, although for most values of fixed cost F
the order of entry is identical to the ranking of the profits (i.e., the first entrant is the one
with the highest profit, the second entrant has the second higher profit, and so on), for
several values of F, the profits of incumbent #2 are higher than those of #1.  For some values
of F, even the profits of incumbent #3 are higher than the profits of player #1.
Market concentration in the free entry game varies with how low the fixed cost is
and therefore how big the threat of further entry is and how much the active firms need to
change their positions to thwart entry.  When the threat of entry increases, firms come to
almost symmetric positions in their attempt to minimize any open interval where a potential
entrant may enter.  The almost symmetric positions also result in very similar prices, which
are generally significantly lower than in the game with a fixed number of firms.  Thus, when
the threat of entry is great, both market concentration and locational asymmetry are low
compared to the game of sequential entry with a fixed number of firms.  Similarly,
consumers surplus loss varies with fixed cost.  As the threat of entry increases, the resulting
almost symmetric positioning results in smaller consumers surplus loss compared to the
case of a fixed number of firms.
As fixed costs decrease, the locational pattern is typically continuous as firms adjust
their positions to thwart entry.  The continuity of the pattern is disrupted as eventually the
entry deterrence strategy fails and a new firm enters.  This is followed by a continuous
variation of locational choices as fixed cost decreases and firms adjust locations to thwart
further entry, to be eventually disrupted again when entry deterrence fails and a new firm
enters.  As a new firm enters, the discontinuous change in the locations of incumbent firms
reduces significantly their pre-entry profits.  This also implies that if incumbents have a
technology (say advertising) that can raise the costs of potential entrants (as well as of
incumbents) (raising both rivals and own costs), they will use it to deter entry.
                                                
13    These results contrast to the results in Cournot competition (quantity leadership), where the first-acting firm
always has a distinct advantage (see Economides (1993b)) and with the price leadership game where the leader
is always at a disadvantage.
28
References
Cao, Jingbin (1991), Spatial Oligopolistic Competition, mimeo.
Eaton, B. Curtis and Myrna Wooders (1985), Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial
Competition, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 16, pp. 282-297.
Economides, Nicholas (1989), Symmetric Equilibrium Existence and Optimality in
Differentiated Products Markets, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 47, no.1, pp.
178-194.
Economides, Nicholas (1993a), Hotellings Main Street with More Than Two
Competitors, Journal of Regional Science, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 303-319.
Economides, Nicholas, (1993b), Quantity Leadership and Social Inefficiency,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 219-237.
Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1986), Spatial Competition and
the Location of Firms, Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics, vol. 5, pp.
1-71.
Hotelling, Harold, (1929), Stability in Competition, Economic Journal, vol. 39, pp.
41-57.
Lane, W. J., (1980), Product Differentiation in a Market with Endogenous Sequential
Entry, Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11 (1), pp. 237-260.
Neven, Damien, (1987), Endogenous Sequential Entry in a Spatial Model,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 5, pp. 419-434.
Prescott, Edward. and M. Visscher (1977), Sequential Location Among Firms with 
Foresight, Bell Journal of Economics.
Rothschild, R. (1976), A Note on the Effect of Sequential Entry on Choice of Location,
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 24, pp. 313-320.
Salop, Steven, C., (1979), Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, Bell Journal
of Economics, vol. 10, pp.141-156.
Shaked, Avner and John Sutton, (1982), Product Differentiation and Industrial
Structure, ICERD Discussion Paper, London School of Economics.
